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The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the
Remoralization of Civil Rights
Joseph E. Kennedy*
The repudiation of rehabilitation and the embrace of retribution
produced a collective experience for young black men that is
wholly different from the rest of American society.  No other
group, as a group, routinely contends with long terms of forced
confinement and bears the stigma of official criminality in all sub-
sequent spheres of social life, as citizens, workers, and spouses.
This is profound social exclusion that significantly rolls back the
gains to citizenship hard won by the civil rights movement.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following.  One in five of the men you knew had a prison
record, and on any given day, one in ten of the men you knew was in jail or
in prison.  Members of your race were eight times more likely to be incarcer-
ated than those of the majority race.  Those incarcerated had a much harder
time marrying, staying married, and parenting their children.  Ten percent of
the children you knew had a father in prison or jail.  Your race used illegal
drugs at only three quarters the rate of other races but was four times more
likely to be arrested for a drug offense.  One out of every five adults you
knew could not vote because of felony convictions.  All of these people were
barred from holding public sector jobs, receiving public assistance (includ-
ing financial aid for college), and obtaining professional licenses.  As a re-
sult of these conditions, most members of your race were seen as a criminal
class by the rest of society, and your race was deeply divided within itself by
the presence of so many incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people.2
These imaginings describe the world of many urban African American
communities in the United States.  If this was your community and your
race, you would probably consider the criminal justice policies responsible
for such high levels of incarceration to be a civil rights issue of primary
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.  The author
would like to thank Maxine Eichner, Eric Muller, Maria Savasta-Kennedy, Andrew Taslitz,
and Deborah Weissman for their helpful comments on the manuscript of this article.  Special
thanks are owed to Al Brophy who did much to educate me about the history of the civil rights
movement in this country.  The author also thanks Mika Chance for invaluable research sup-
port and the editors and staff of the Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review for their
excellent work throughout the publication process.  Remaining shortcomings are the responsi-
bility of the author alone.
1 BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 6 (2006).
2 See infra Part II.
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importance.  For much of the twentieth century, however, civil rights organi-
zations focused the majority of their resources and attention on fighting
other forms of social injustice.  Education, housing, employment, and voting
have been the primary concerns of the civil rights movement for most of the
last seventy years.  More specifically, these causes have been the primary
concerns of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple (“NAACP”) and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the two organizations
that have played the central role in legal reform in the area of racial justice
for African Americans.3  Recently, however, the NAACP has identified chal-
lenging the mass incarceration of African Americans as one of its main pri-
orities in the coming years.4
To understand the importance of mass incarceration as a civil rights
issue, one must understand the direct effects of mass incarceration on Afri-
can American communities and families.  Yet one must also understand the
vision of African American families and communities upon which mass in-
carceration is premised and rhetorically justified.  Social scientists have
studied and documented mass incarceration’s impacts on the urban commu-
nities where incarceration is most concentrated,5  but the premises of mass
incarceration have not yet been fully understood.
Simply put, mass incarceration ultimately rests on the notion that Afri-
can Americans need to be incarcerated in historically unprecedented num-
bers because of a moral breakdown in their communities that has resulted in
a significant increase in serious crime.6  This moral breakdown serves as a
justification for adopting what I describe in this article as a “fundamentalist
3 While the NAACP’s initial focus was protecting African Americans from lynching, mob
violence, and gross miscarriages of criminal justice, the organization began to shift its focus in
the 1930s to economic issues such as education and employment. See, e.g., August Meier &
John H. Bracey, Jr., The NAACP as a Reform Movement, 1909-1965:  “To Reach the Con-
science of America,” 59 J. S. HIST. 3, 13-17 (1993); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century,
100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2065, 2073-96 (2002) (noting that the NAACP in the 1940s broad-
ened its focus from the “politics of protection”—that of protecting African Americans against
exclusively state-sponsored threats to life, liberty, and property—to the “politics of recogni-
tion”:  ending discrimination and exclusion of African Americans in the private as well as
public spheres).  Even after this shift in focus, however, the NAACP worked to protect the
procedural rights of criminal defendants and mounted a major campaign against the death
penalty.  Eskridge, supra, at 2096, 2287-99.
4 MONIQUE MORRIS, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, YEAR
ONE:  TOWARD SAFE COMMUNITIES, GOOD SCHOOLS AND A FAIR CHANCE FOR ALL AMERI-
CANS, 3, 5-8 (2009) (noting the harmful effects of mass incarceration on people of color and
calling for alternatives to incarceration).  Since his appointment in May of 2008, the President
of the NAACP, Benjamin T. Jealous, has spoken forcefully about the importance of challeng-
ing mass incarceration.  “‘A hundred years from now we’re going to be judged by our
grandchildren,’ he says.  ‘They’re going to look back, and they’re going to say, this country had
the most incarcerated on Earth.  Young black people were the most incarcerated in modern
history.  What did you do about it?’”  Adam Server, The Other Black President:  The NAACP
Confronts a New Political—and Racial—Era, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 23, 2009, at 12.
5 See infra Part III.
6 See infra Part III.A.
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approach” to punishment.  Under the fundamentalist approach to punish-
ment, crime is assumed to be the product of a basic moral failure in both the
individual offender and in the community at large, not the product of any set
of social conditions or circumstances.  This fundamentalist approach, in turn,
leads to the policies that have resulted in the mass incarceration of African
Americans.  Mass incarceration seems necessary to people who believe that
African American communities suffer from widespread moral breakdown.
Properly understood, such a belief in moral breakdown is indefensible.
Recent work by sociologists, criminologists, and economists suggests that
poor urban African American communities are not communities whose
norms of moral behavior have broken down, but communities whose moral
norms have come under unprecedented strain.7  In fact, significant social sci-
ence evidence suggests that the residents of the poorest African American
urban communities believe deeply in the family and in economic values of
mainstream American society but are unable to realize those values because
of the emergence of a relatively new and concentrated form of jobless pov-
erty during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.8
This distinction between moral breakdown and moral strain is a critical
one.  In communities that have suffered moral breakdown and have no
norms, incarcerating large numbers of criminals may be the only way to
maintain order and to regenerate the core moral norms that have been lost.
Punishment in a normless community must be severe and inflexible in order
to send the strongest possible message to both the individual and the com-
munity about the need for new norms of behavior.  Such policies of mass
incarceration, however, are an unnecessary response to crime in a commu-
nity whose norms of moral behavior remain intact but are badly strained by
socioeconomic conditions.  These policies are, in fact, counterproductive be-
cause mass incarceration actually disintegrates vulnerable communities.9
Mass incarceration is a critical civil rights issue facing African Ameri-
cans for a second distinct but related reason.  Mass incarceration as a prac-
tice “demoralizes” the broader movement for civil rights for African
Americans in ways that also have not been sufficiently appreciated.  Mass
incarceration has robbed the civil rights movement of some of the moral
authority it enjoyed during the years of its early successes.  The significance,
pervasiveness, and visibility of mass incarceration as a social policy confirm
its own false premise of moral breakdown among poor African American
communities by stigmatizing those communities.  Moreover, fundamentalist
ways of thinking about punishment directly support fundamentalist ways of
thinking about broader issues of racial justice.  Under the fundamentalist
mindset, the moral failings of African Americans are responsible for crime
and their inability to achieve further economic progress, not the social or
7 See infra Parts III.B and IV.A.
8 See infra Part IV.B.
9 See infra Part II.
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economic conditions they face.  In both domains this social fundamentalism
sees the essential problem to be a lack of personal responsibility, and contex-
tual factors only reinforce this view.  Directly challenging racially dispropor-
tionate mass incarceration is essential to “remoralizing” and reinvigorating
the quest for racial justice for those most vulnerable to other forms of dis-
crimination. The mass incarceration of African Americans is the unguarded
and badly exploited flank of the movement for racial justice.  Defending that
flank is important to civil rights progress on any other front.
The story of the Jena Six and the truly startling national response that it
mobilized suggests that the time may be right for just such a challenge.  The
sudden and overwhelming response to the manifest injustices of the Jena Six
case may prove to be a turning point in the marginalization of criminal jus-
tice issues as core civil rights concerns.  Seemingly out of nowhere, a na-
tional movement arose in response to a clearly egregious case of racial
injustice, but one that was not without precedent or parallel.  What is per-
haps most notable in this respect is that the Jena Six case is, like mass incar-
ceration, essentially a case of egregiously disproportionate punishment that
is deeply influenced by racial factors.10
Part II of this Article describes how mass incarceration disintegrates
poor African American communities politically, socially, and economically.
Part III explains how mass incarceration is premised on a vision of moral
breakdown in African American communities.  Part IV argues that available
evidence suggests that this premise is false and that the communities con-
cerned suffer from moral strain, not moral breakdown.  The Conclusion
briefly argues that challenging mass incarceration is essential in order to
make continued progress in other areas of the movement for civil rights, and
that the national response to the Jena Six case suggests that the time might
be ripe for such a challenge.
II. THE DISINTEGRATIVE IMPACT OF MASS INCARCERATION ON
AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
For those living in the communities most affected, mass incarceration
has undone many of the gains of the civil rights movement.  Incarceration is
so widespread and long-lasting in the poorest African American urban com-
munities that it has profoundly changed the very nature of those communi-
ties.  A major theme in the literature studying the effects of such extensive
incarceration is disintegration.  Mass incarceration disintegrates families and
communities by destabilizing economic, familial, and political relationships
and creating enduring barriers to the future integration of the incarcerated
person back into the life of their community.
10 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The Jena Six and the History of Racially Compromised Justice
in Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (2009).
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African American communities have always suffered from discrimina-
tion and more than their share of poverty, but mass incarceration is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon.  Before the beginnings of mass incarceration in
the late 1970s, such poor communities did not suffer from widespread incar-
ceration because prison was reserved for the most serious offenders.11
Although young minority men with little schooling had relatively
high rates of incarceration, before the 1980s the penal system was
not a dominant presence in disadvantaged neighborhoods.  Crimi-
nal behavior, as officially recognized by the police, was much
more unusual than poverty. . . .  For the most part, prisons housed
extremely violent offenders, hardcore drug addicts, and career
criminals—an underground guild of burglars, thieves, and
hustlers.12
Mass incarceration has changed the relationship between poverty and pun-
ishment.  “Punishment has become normalized, affecting large social groups
rather than just the behaviorally distinctive deviants in the shadows of social
life.”13  Indeed, rather than a punishment for deviance, incarceration is be-
coming increasingly normal for young disadvantaged men.14  With the ad-
vent of mass incarceration, prison has gone from being a minor presence in
the lives of African American communities to a regular one.
African Americans are incarcerated in numbers greatly disproportionate
to their share of the population.  Simply put, “African Americans are eight
times more likely to be incarcerated than whites.”15  The sheer extent of
incarceration among African Americans is almost difficult to comprehend.
“Among black men born in the late 1960s who received no more than a high
school education, 30 percent had served time in prison by their mid-thirties;
60 percent of high school dropouts had prison records.”16  According to one
study, on an average day in 1999 almost 8% of African American men aged
thirty to thirty-four and 30% of young African American men who were
high school dropouts were in prison or jail.17  Overall, “black men in their
early thirties at the end of the 1990s were more likely to have been to prison
than to have graduated from college with a four-year degree.”18
11 Bruce Western, Mary Pattillo & David Weiman, Introduction to IMPRISONING AMERICA:
THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 1, 2 (Mary Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce
Western eds., 2004).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 3.
14 Id.
15 WESTERN, supra note 1, at 3. R
16 Id.
17 Western et al., supra note 11, at 6-7. R
18 WESTERN, supra note 1, at xii.  While more than 90% of prisoners are men, the incarcer- R
ation of women in these communities—though much smaller in number—may have an impact
out of proportion to their numbers because of the role women often play in their communities.
See TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES 10 (2007) (“The role women play in their social
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The disintegrative effect of incarceration on African American family
life has been well documented.  Incarceration weakens and strains mar-
riages.19  It also reduces the incidence of marriage.  One study estimates that
incarceration is why 20% fewer African American men are married than
white men.  Incarceration also deprives many African American children of
the presence of their fathers.  “By 2000, over a million black children—9
percent of those under eighteen—had a father in prison or jail.  In around
half of all cases, these fathers were living with their children at the time they
were incarcerated.”20  Furthermore, “[a] child who is exposed to a parent or
sibling who went to prison has an increased, rather than a decreased, risk of
incarceration.”21  The evidence also suggests that many of these men played
some role in the lives of their families before being incarcerated.  In the mid-
1980s, roughly half of African American fathers admitted into the state
prison system were living with their children—approximately the same per-
centage as white prisoners; by the mid-1990s, the number had dropped to
40% for African American fathers.22  While racial breakdowns are not avail-
able, we know that many prisoners maintain contact with children while in-
carcerated.  “Nearly half of all incarcerated parents have some kind of
regular contact with their children,” with 20% to 25% of parents receiving
regular visits from their children.23
Mass incarceration also divides offenders from their communities in
other ways.  Putting incarceration aside, the collateral consequences of a fel-
ony conviction alone can bar an ex-offender from many forms of participa-
tion in normal community life.  A study in the mid-1990s showed a marked
increase in the number of states with laws allowing felony convictions to be
used to provide the basis for divorce, termination of parental rights, denial of
the right to hold office, and loss of the right to possess a firearm.24  Many
states have also “increased the number of occupational bars for people with
various criminal convictions,” including jobs as teachers, child care work-
ers, and in related occupations.25
Because the War on Drugs has resulted in felony convictions for many
African American men, the special collateral consequences of drug convic-
tions profoundly impact African American community life.  An American
networks, social capital, and informal social controls, especially in very poor urban neighbor-
hoods, is thought to be more important, per person, than men.”).
19 WESTERN, supra note 1, at 157 (“The evidence so far suggests that the prison boom R
separated many fathers from their children and contributed to low marriage rates and high risks
of divorce among poor urban residents.”).
20 Id. at 5.
21 CLEAR, supra note 18, at 6. R
22 Western et al., supra note 11, at 10. R
23 Id.
24 Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment:  An Instrument of Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISH-
MENT:  THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 22 (Marc Mauer &
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT].
25 Id.
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Bar Association task force summarized the collateral consequences of a fel-
ony conviction of a first time drug offender:
[A]s a result of his conviction he may be ineligible for many fed-
erally-funded health and welfare benefits, food stamps, public
housing, and federal educational assistance.  His driver’s license
may be automatically suspended, and he may no longer qualify for
certain employment and professional licenses. . . .  He will not be
permitted to enlist in the military, or possess a firearm, or obtain a
federal security clearance.  If a citizen, he may lose the right to
vote; if not, he becomes immediately deportable.26
Oddly, a convicted armed robber or rapist can apply for student loans and
welfare benefits but a drug offender cannot.27
African American men are especially vulnerable to the impact of many
of these legal restrictions.  Public sector bans on employing ex-felons, for
example, eliminate an entire category of jobs on which African Americans
have historically relied for employment.28  “The large numbers of blacks re-
turning from prison, therefore, face an ever-shrinking pool of eligible jobs
from which to transition out of crime.”29
Even where a formal rule against employing ex-felons does not exist,
incarceration adversely affects employment opportunities for African Ameri-
can men in very profound ways.  “Survey analysis shows that incarceration
significantly reduces the wages, employment, and annual earnings of former
inmates, even though their economic opportunities are extremely poor to
begin with.”30  As more and more states make criminal records more widely
available, government has effectively gone into the business of what Devah
Pager has described as “the credentialing of stigma.”31
26 Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, Introduction to INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note
24, at 1, 5 (citation omitted). R
27 Id. at 6.
28 DEVAH PAGER, MARKED:  RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS IN-
CARCERATION 33 (2007).
29 Id.
30 WESTERN, supra note 1, at 7. See generally PAGER, supra note 28, at 108-30. R
31 PAGER, supra note 28, at 4.  Pager writes: R
For each individual processed through the criminal justice system, police records,
court documents, and corrections databases detail dates of arrest, charges, convic-
tion, and terms of incarceration.  Most states make these records publicly available,
often through on-line repositories, accessible to employers, landlords, creditors, and
other interested parties.  With increasing numbers of occupations, public services,
and other social goods becoming off-limits to ex-offenders, these records can be
used as the official basis for eligibility determination or exclusion.  The state in this
way serves as a credentialing institution, providing official and public certification of
those among us who have been convicted of wrongdoing.  The ‘credential’ of a crim-
inal record, like educational or professional credentials, constitutes a formal and en-
during classification of social status, which can be used to regulate access and
opportunity across numerous social, economic, and political domains.
Id.
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These “criminal credentials” matter greatly because employers “appear
less concerned about specific information conveyed by a criminal conviction
and its bearing on a particular job, but rather view this credential as an indi-
cator of general employability or trustworthiness.”32  To explore how a crim-
inal record affected employment decisions, Pager used black and white
college students as “testers.”  These testers used identical sets of fictional
resumes and criminal records to apply for entry level jobs.  Even her highly
educated African American tester applicants suffered serious disadvantages
in the application process.  The existence of a criminal record reduced a
black tester’s chance of being called back by 60%.33  Comparatively, “blacks
were less than half as likely to receive callbacks as equally qualified white
applicants.”34  Furthermore, a white tester with a criminal record had as
good a chance of being called back for an interview as a black tester without
a criminal record.35
Despite the fact that the white applicant revealed evidence of a
felony drug conviction, and despite the fact that he reported having
only recently returned from a year and a half in prison, employers
seemed to view this applicant as no more risky than a young black
man with no history of criminal involvement.36
Pager concluded that a “two strikes and you’re out” mentality existed among
employers, who appeared “to view the combination of blackness and crimi-
nal record as an indicator of serious trouble.”37  Even more disturbingly,
Pager’s study revealed that these stereotypes and their attendant prejudices
were exacerbated when the job applicants had personal contact with the em-
ployer.  The gap between white testers with criminal records and black test-
ers with criminal records was even greater when the employer had a chance
to interact with the applicant.38
32 Id. at 5.
33 Id. at 69.
34 Id. at 90.
35 Id. at 90-91.
36 Id. at 91.
37 PAGER, supra note 28, at 146.  Pager explains: R
Racial stereotypes triggered by the appearance of a young black man . . . are further
intensified by the revelation of his criminal past.  Subtle and perhaps unconscious
concerns about black applicants are at once confirmed, weakening any incentive to
give a young black man the benefit of the doubt.  Among young white men, by
contrast, the reaction is likely to be quite different.  Because whites do not fit the
stereotypical profile of a criminal, employers may be more willing to overlook a
single prior conviction.  A young white man with a criminal background can more
convincingly explain that he made a regrettable mistake and has learned his lesson.
His prior criminal involvement is then interpreted as an isolated incident rather than
an internal disposition.
Id. at 101-02 (citation omitted).
38 Id. at 105-07.
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Finally, African Americans are also politically disenfranchised by the
policies of mass incarceration.  Originally applying only to those convicted
of “high crimes,” felon disenfranchisement was greatly expanded after the
Civil War.39  Additionally, states have classified more and more crimes as
felonies.40  Manza and Uggen estimate that there were 5.3 million disen-
franchised felons in the 2004 election, which was 2.5% of the voting age
population.41
Felon disenfranchisement rules hit the African American population
hardest of all.  More than 1.8 million African Americans cannot vote be-
cause of felony convictions.42  The U.S. Civil Rights Commission identified
felon disenfranchisement as “the biggest hindrance to black voting since the
poll tax.”43  Some studies estimated that “at least one in seven black men
nationally have lost the right to vote.”44  Manza and Uggen estimate that
sixteen states disenfranchise 20% to 40% of their eligible African American
voters on account of felony convictions; thirteen states disenfranchise 10%
to 20%; and an additional fourteen states disenfranchise 5% to 10%.45  “[I]n
fourteen states, more than 1 in 10 African Americans have lost the right to
vote by virtue of a felony conviction, and 5 of these states disqualify over 20
percent of the African American voting age population.”46  Interviews with
such disenfranchised African Americans reveal a profound sense of aliena-
tion arising from the various collateral consequences of their convictions.47
Finally, mass incarceration is politically disintegrative in another way:
it divides the black community against itself.  “[T]he prison boom has
driven a wedge into the black community, where those without college edu-
cation are now traveling a path of unique disadvantage that increasingly sep-
arates them from college-educated blacks.”48  By sowing division and
39 JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT:  FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 8 (2006).
40 Id. at 8-9.
41 Id. at 76.
42 ELIZABETH A. HULL, DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 9 (2006).
43 Id. (citations omitted).
44 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 39, at 80. R
45 Id.
46 Id. at 79.
47 Id. at 152.  One woman in prison described the comprehensive and profound sense of
alienation she expected to experience as a felon upon returning to society:
When I leave here it will be very difficult for me in the sense that I’m a felon . . . it
will affect my job, it will affect my education . . . custody, it can affect child support,
it can affect everywhere—family, friends, housing . . . .  People that are convicted of
drug crimes can’t even get housing anymore . . . .  Yes, I did my prison time.  How
long are you going to punish me as a result of it? . . . .  It’s the housing, it’s the credit
re-establishing . . . .  I mean even to go into the school, to work with my child’s
class—and I’m not a sex offender—but all I need is one parent who says, “Isn’t she a
felon?  I don’t want her with my child.”  Bingo.  And you know that there are people
out there like that.
Id.
48 WESTERN, supra note 1, at 7. R
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exclusion within the racial community it affects most, mass incarceration
makes itself that much harder to challenge.
In combination, the familial, economic, and political effects of mass
incarceration have weakened and impoverished already poor communities.
“Concentrated incarceration in those impoverished communities has broken
families, weakened the social-control capacity of parents, eroded economic
strength, soured attitudes toward society, and distorted politics; even, after
reaching a certain level, it has increased rather than decreased crime.”49
Mass incarceration in the poorest African American urban communities is so
pervasive and so influential that it changes the very nature of community life
in a profound and undesirable way:
Prison is thus woven into the fabric of these communities, with its
stark implications for social networks, social capital, and, ulti-
mately, informal social control.  Men who are behind bars are the
missing links in the social network of those who remain behind.
Since these networks have limited strength to begin with, the
widespread reality of prison undermines their ability to provide
social capital.  And neighborhoods with lots of men behind bars
are places with especially low endowments of social capital.  Be-
cause prison saps the limited economic and interpersonal resources
of families with a loved one behind bars, both the families and the
neighborhood stay impoverished.50
Mass incarceration has also changed what it means for a young African
American male to live a normal life in the community in a way that per-
versely perpetuates crime and further incarceration.  Bruce Western has de-
scribed how incarceration changes the normal life course of many African
American men:
Adolescents are drawn into the society of adults by passing
through a sequence of life course states—completing school, find-
ing a job, getting married, and starting a family.  The integrative
power of the life course offers a way out of crime for adult offend-
ers.  Men involved in crime who can find steady work and a stable
marriage also become embedded in a web of social supports and
obligations.  These social bonds help criminally active men desist
from further offending. . . . Although the normal life course is
integrative, incarceration is disintegrative, diverting young men
from the life states that mark a man’s gradual inclusion in adult
society.51
49 CLEAR, supra note 18, at 5. R
50 Id. at 10 (citing DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE (2004)).
51 WESTERN, supra note 1, at 4-5. R
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Whereas the normal life course draws young men into productive family and
economic life, incarceration diverts and often effectively bars these men
from integrating themselves into family and economic life.  The dis-
integrated former offender becomes a high risk for future offending because
nothing connects him to the normal life of the law abiding.  To the contrary,
incarceration has itself become a “rite of passage” for young African Ameri-
can men in the inner city.52  In this way, mass incarceration perversely in-
creases crime, thereby sustaining itself in an ever more vicious cycle.
“Large pools of former inmates with few social supports, family attach-
ments, or economic opportunities may ultimately increase crime rates more
than they were lowered by the expansion of the penal system in the first
place.”53
The end result is a profound social exclusion that for the communities
most affected undoes much of the work of the civil rights movement.
The punitive turn in criminal justice disappointed the promise of
the civil rights movement and its burdens fell heavily on disadvan-
taged African Americans.  By cleaving off poor black communi-
ties from the mainstream, the prison boom left America more
divided.  Incarceration rates are now so high that the stigma of
criminality brands not only individuals, but an entire generation of
young black men with little schooling.54
To be sure, serious crime is often committed by people who are not
integrated into family or community and who might even be fairly described
as normless.  Such offenders are more likely to reoffend, in greater need for
incapacitation, less likely to rehabilitate, and may even be more blamewor-
thy.  Because crime, too, has its disintegrative effects on a community, it is
reasonable to assume that incarcerating serious offenders who are already
disintegrated from their communities may be a net plus for the community in
this respect.  What is notable and distinct about the policies of mass incar-
ceration, however, is that a default presumption that such offenders are the
norm is effectively enshrined in sentencing standards and processes that are
inflexible and severe.  The wider the scope of incarceration in a community
the greater the risk is that one is incarcerating those who may yet success-
fully integrate themselves into the fabric of the community.  Such over-in-
carceration becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in the sense that it weakens
both the incarcerated individual’s capacity to reintegrate as well as diminish-
ing the overall integration of the community itself.
52 CLEAR, supra note 18, at 9. R
53 Western et al., supra note 11, at 5; see also CLEAR, supra note 18, at 10 (“The high R
incarceration rates in poor communities destabilize the social relationships in these places and
help cause crime rather than prevent it.”).
54 WESTERN, supra note 1, at 7. R
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III. MASS INCARCERATION AND THE PREMISE OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN MORAL BREAKDOWN
Mass incarceration was justified in great part by a narrative of moral
decline generally and among urban African Americans specifically.  The un-
deniable increase in crime that began in the 1960s and continued into the
1970s was interpreted in large measure as evidence of a moral decline in
inner-city African American communities.55  This much is well understood.
What remains to be understood, however, is how mass incarceration was
ultimately premised not just on a general decline in moral conduct but upon
widespread moral breakdown, a distinction that matters greatly to how soci-
ety approaches criminal punishment.  Ultimately, the rhetorical backbone of
mass incarceration is a narrative about the need for the criminal justice sys-
tem to respond to a complete breakdown in family values and work ethic
among inner city African Americans.  In this narrative, moral breakdown
necessitates what I will describe as a fundamentalist response to crime, a
response designed to regenerate lost norms of moral behavior by taking a
severe and categorical approach to dealing with relatively minor offenses
and to even first offenders.  The public accepted the need for extremely
harsh punishment for minor crimes because they accepted the premise of
moral breakdown that makes fundamentalism in punishment seem necessary
and just.
This fundamentalist approach to punishment, however, proceeds from a
flawed premise.  No evidence exists to support the assumption that inner city
crime was the result of a complete moral breakdown in the African Ameri-
can communities of the inner city.  What evidence exists supports a very
different conclusion.  These communities suffered and continue to suffer not
from moral breakdown but from moral strain, a key distinction that I will
explain more fully.  This moral strain has resulted from a new, concentrated
form of jobless poverty that developed in the inner city during the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s in the wake of a period of economic expansion that had
recently drawn African American workers and families to these communities
in unprecedented numbers.  That strain not withstanding, the available evi-
dence suggests that African Americans continue to hold mainstream values
and to aspire to the American Dream.  White Americans’ fears to the con-
trary may in fact be rooted in anxieties about family and community life that
are more germane to middle class life than to that of the urban poor.
A. Mass Incarceration and the Myth of Moral Breakdown
All categories of crime, and violent crime in particular, increased by
most objective measures in the 1970s, and the wider American public grew
55 See infra Part III.A.
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understandably concerned.56  In this sense, mass incarceration did not simply
come out of nowhere.  It is the severity, the overbreadth, and the duration of
the response to that crime increase that has drawn the attention and the criti-
cism of so many.57  The increase in incarceration that ensued over the fol-
lowing decades was far out of proportion to the crime increase.  Over time
the level of incarceration remained high even when crime rates dropped.
A number of different stories have been told about the role that race
played in this disproportionate response to crime and in the disproportionate
incarceration of African Americans.  The backdrop for these stories is a
larger story about white middle class backlash during the 1970s.  African
Americans and other people of color were seen to have benefited greatly
during the 1960s from the victories of the civil rights movement and from
social programs undertaken as part of the War on Poverty.58  These gains
were seen by many to have come at the expense of the white middle class:
white workers lost jobs and educational opportunities to African Americans
under affirmative action programs, and white middle class taxpayers were
subsidizing social programs that they thought disproportionately benefited
nonwhites.  Against this backdrop, a number of different accounts have
emerged about the role race played in the advent of mass incarceration.
Loı¨c Wacquant has argued that mass incarceration is a means of racial
control that is the modern day equivalent of slavery.59  Wacquant describes a
successive series of “peculiar institutions” of racial control in the U.S., from
chattel slavery to Jim Crow discrimination and segregation to the develop-
ment of the urban ghetto in the wake of the large migrations of African
Americans to the cities in the mid-1900s.  The combination of the
“hyperghetto” and the prison, an arrangement that he dates from 1968 to the
present, is the final institutional phase and one that emerged in response to
both the urban unrest and the racial progress of the 60s.60  In Wacquant’s
account, the economic and social isolation of the ghetto makes it an
“ethnoracial prison,” and the racial composition of prison makes it a
ghetto.61  Wacquant describes the emergence of these conjoined arrange-
ments as “a single carceral continuum which entraps a redundant population
of younger black men (and increasingly women) who circulate in closed
circuit between its two poles. . . .”62
56 KEVIN R. REITZ & HENRY RUTH, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 73-80 (2003).
57 See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 21-62 (2004) (discussing this prob-
lem and referencing several other commentators).
58 THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION:  THE IMPACT OF RACE,
RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (1991) (describing conservative policies as suc-
cessfully “pitting those who bear many of the costs of federal intervention against those whose
struggle for equality has been advanced by interventionist government policies”).
59 Loı¨c Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration, 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41, 41-42
(2002).
60 Id. at 42.
61 Id. at 49-51.
62 Id. at 52-53.
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By the end of the seventies, then, as the racial and class backlash
against the democratic advances won by the social movements of
the preceding decade got into full swing, the prison abruptly re-
turned to the forefront of American society and offered itself as the
universal and simplex solution to all manners of social problems.
Chief among these problems was the ‘breakdown’ of social order
in the ‘inner city’ . . . As the walls of the ghetto shook and
threatened to crumble, the walls of the prison were correspond-
ingly extended, enlarged and fortified . . . .63
Katherine Beckett has described a direct but subtler role for race in the
politics of mass incarceration.64  She has emphasized the ways in which the
law and order politics of the 1960s and 1970s can be understood as a
counter-attack against the civil rights movement.  At the most basic level,
“[s]outhern politicians and law enforcement officials who called civil rights
protesters ‘thugs’ and decried ‘crime in the streets’. . . were attempting to
define protest activities as ‘criminal’ rather than political in nature.”65  Over
time, however, the stakes became even greater as the civil rights movement
expanded into a broader movement for social justice.
At stake was the question of whether the federal government is
obligated to assume responsibility for creating a more egalitarian
society.  Without being explicitly identified as such, competing
images of the poor as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ became central
components of this debate.  In drawing attention to the problems
of street crime, drug addiction, and delinquency, and by depicting
these problems as examples of the immorality of the impover-
ished, conservatives promoted the latter image.  The crimes of the
poor were thus used as evocative symbols of their undeserving and
dangerous nature.  The racialized nature of this imagery has been a
crucial resource for those attempting to promote this conception
and policies that reflect it.66
Citing survey research that law and order politics are “particularly popular
among those who hold racially and socially conservative views,” Beckett
concludes that racial hostility formed a key component of support for puni-
tive anticrime policies.67
Most recently, Michael Flamm has emphasized the ways that hostility
to crime and hostility to political movements for civil rights and social jus-
tice blended easily together in the politics of law and order in both conscious
63 Id. at 52.
64 KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY:  LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 12 (1997).
65 Id. at 6.
66 Id. at 11.
67 Id. at 12.
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and unconscious ways.68  “At a popular level, law and order resonated both
as a social ideal and political slogan because it combined an understandable
concern over the rising number of traditional crimes . . . with implicit and
explicit unease about civil rights, civil liberties, urban riots, antiwar protests,
moral values, and drug use.”69  Part of the appeal of law and order rhetoric is
the way in which it simplifies social disorder into a story about bad guys,
good guys, and the need for firm moral leadership by government.70
What draws these somewhat different accounts together is the central
story about moral decline that plays out in each.  Stephanie Coontz has de-
scribed the “new consensus” on the African American family that emerged
during this time.  “Black poverty exists because black men are irresponsible,
black women are immoral, and black children run wild. . . . What African
Americans need, according to what is often called ‘the new consensus,’ are
not government programs but a good dose of sexual restraint, marital com-
mitment, and parental discipline.”71
With respect to crime, conservative proponents of law and order claim
that moral decline produced particularly dangerous offenders.  These con-
servatives “located the root causes of contemporary urban crime in what
they characterized as a growing problem of ‘moral poverty’—family break-
down, social disorganization, drug use, and the like—which had spawned a
new generation of selfish, impulsive, predator propensities of morally im-
poverished street criminals.”72  The idea that this moral decline has produced
a “new” type of predatory youthful offender was a particularly common
trope in the rhetoric justifying mass incarceration.  As the conservative crim-
inologist James Wilson put it, “[w]e are terrified by the prospect of innocent
people being gunned down at random, without warning and almost without
motive, by youngsters who afterward show us the blank, unremorseful faces
of seemingly feral, presocial beings.”73 Time magazine wrote in a 1977
cover story on juvenile crime that “[a] new remorseless mutant juvenile
68 MICHAEL FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER:  STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF
LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 4 (2005).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE:  AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOS-
TALGIA TRAP 235 (2d ed. 2000).
72 PAGER, supra note 28, at 17-18. R
73 JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE 2-3 (1999) (quoting James Q. Wilson, What to Do About
Crime, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1994, at 25, 26).  Jerome Miller has pointed out that this is a
cyclically recurring theme:
With rising concern over urban violence in the 1980s and 1990s came the re-
cycling of the familiar “new breed” theory of young offenders—with the implicit
focus on the young black male offender.
. . .
Politicians and human-service professionals alike periodically call the public’s atten-
tion to this ostensibly more unfeeling, cold, and dangerous young offender who now
stalks our streets.
JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY:  AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 37-38 (1996).
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seems to have been born, and there is no more terrifying figure in America
today.”74
A related theme is that the violence such amoral offenders produce is
“random,” and all the more terrifying and dangerous for its senseless, unpre-
dictable quality.  “The message seemed to be that random violence is every-
where and you are no longer safe—not in your suburban home, commuter
train, or automobile—and the police and the courts cannot or will not help
you.”75  Joel Best has pointed out that implicit in these representations of
violence as random is a theme of deterioration.  “Warnings about random
violence imply that things are getting worse, that there are ever more violent
incidents, that respectable citizens run greater risks of victimization than in
the past.”76  Simply put, conservative advocates of law and order during this
time readily thought of crime and criminals in monstrous terms for reasons
arising directly from moral concerns.77
B. Moral Breakdown Versus Moral Strain
What lies at the heart of this law and order rhetoric about moral break-
down used to justify the policies of mass incarceration is a particular but
unarticulated vision of moral decline.  Moral decline can take many forms,
but mass incarceration—given the enormous and entirely foreseeable disin-
tegrative effects described in Part II of this Article—can only be legitimately
justified by what I would term a complete moral breakdown.  When a policy
of punishment so completely disintegrates a community—socially, economi-
cally, and politically—the only legitimate grounds for continuing to carry
out this punishment would be that the community essentially has to be dis-
integrated in order to be repaired.  References by conservative proponents of
mass incarceration to a “new” breed of remorseless, “presocial” predators
born of “moral poverty”78 use rhetorically loaded language to evoke concep-
tions of normless individuals and communities without fully articulating
what is being implied—that the process for maintaining and transmitting
moral norms has effectively broken down.
A complete moral breakdown leaves a community essentially normless,
and a normless community is different from a community whose norms are
merely under strain.  A community with strained norms may suffer high
levels of crime and social disorder, but the norms of good behavior will
reassert themselves once the strain is removed or ameliorated.  Material as-
sistance to a community without norms will not result in its moral rehabilita-
74 PHILIP JENKINS, DECADE OF NIGHTMARES 137 (2006).
75 BEST, supra note 73, at 3 (quoting Jerome H. Skolnick, Wild Pitch: “Three Strikes, R
You’re Out” and Other Bad Calls on Crime, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1994, at 30, 34-5).
76 Id. at 9-10.
77 See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (2000).
78 See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. R
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tion.  Material assistance to a normless community is like watering ground
that has no seeds:  nothing will grow from nothing.  In fact, given the lack of
personal responsibility in a normless community, material assistance may
actually result in further moral corruption as people are enabled to continue
lifestyles that are decadent and unproductive.  Welfare assistance and jobs
programs for such a community cannot create norms of responsible behavior
but may in fact retard their development if such programs make life too easy
and cause community members to lose their motivation to improve their own
lives.
What a normless community requires above all is moral education to
regenerate lost norms about how to behave in civil society.  Moral education
provides the seeds from which healthy norms of behavior can grow and take
root.  This pressing need for moral education in a normless community is
best served by a fundamentalist approach to criminal punishment where con-
textual factors do not excuse or mitigate responsibility.  African Americans
who lack norms of social responsibility and self reliance risk being corrupted
by the idea that their problems are not their fault, and are instead the fault of
racial problems in society.  Under this style of reasoning, any further remedy
beyond the elimination of formal discrimination runs the risk of com-
pounding the loss of personal responsibility that attends normlessness.
Such fundamentalist theories of criminal punishment imply certain ap-
proaches to the enforcement of the criminal law.  In a community where the
process of transmitting and maintaining moral values has broken down, the
broader educative dimension of sentencing, rather than the individual cir-
cumstances of the particular case, becomes paramount.  In such a commu-
nity, the criminal justice system must impose punishment categorically and
forcefully in order to inculcate and reestablish the lost norms of moral
behavior.
Tone and atmosphere also become important in a normless community.
Public disorder undermines the morally educative function of the law that is
so essential to restoring a normless community to a healthy state.  Minor
transgressions must therefore be punished severely in order to set the right
tone for the community so that replanted norms can take root and flourish.79
Zero tolerance policies make sense in a normless society because consis-
tency is the best way to establish the authority of new norms in the face of
an ever present tendency to backslide to the easier and normless ways of the
past.
In a normless community, the criminal law must also take an aggressive
approach to personal vices.  Drug use in particular must be dealt with
harshly in normless communities because the escape from reality that drug
use permits will disable the community members from exercising the neces-
79 For a discussion and critique of Order-Maintenance (“Broken Windows”) approaches
to law enforcement, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER:  THE FALSE
PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
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sary discipline for moral development and productive life.80  Many people
believe that crime is contagious in a normless community.  Just as an infec-
tion spreads quickly through a weakened host, crime spreads through nor-
mless communities because of their essential emptiness.  Epidemics of drug
use or crime spread in a normless community because they give some sense
of meaning, connection, or at the very least diversion to individuals whose
lives lack these elements.
A normless community is also a place where offenders are likely to be
beyond rehabilitation.  Normless people are dangerous because their lack of
attachment to family or community means that they are unfeeling, just like
the imagined predators described earlier.  Such offenders must be closely
monitored and swiftly incapacitated.  The children who come of age in a
normless community are in particular to be feared because they presumably
received insufficient moral education during their formative years.  They are
poor candidates for rehabilitation because therapy and counseling programs
can hardly be expected to make up for the absence of early moral education
from their family or community.
In sum, the die has already been cast for offenders in normless commu-
nities, so the best thing to do is to simply turn the page on the current crop
and hope to create a clearer moral order through categorically applied, dra-
conian sentences that allow communities to raise a better generation of
children.81
IV. AFRICAN AMERICAN NORM STRAIN AND THE ECONOMIC
STRESSES OF THE 1980S AND 1990S
A community with norms under strain is, in contrast, a very different
sort of place that requires a very different type of criminal justice policy.
Norms can be strained by any number of material conditions:  wars; epi-
sodes of widespread violence; poverty; and massive migrations of people.
In a community suffering strain to its norms, the criminal justice system can
consider the individual circumstances of the particular offense and offender
with relatively little fear that reasonable acts of leniency will be construed in
the community as an abdication of moral authority.  The pressure on the
criminal justice system to play a morally educative role is less.  The expres-
sive dimension of the law can take a back seat to the task of doing justice in
the individual case.  More to the point, the system can balance the disinte-
grative effects of incarceration upon both the individual and the community
80 For a discussion of the role that the War Against Drugs plays in the mass incarceration
of African Americans, see MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT:  RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISH-
MENT IN AMERICA 4 (1995). Admittedly, the violence attendant the business of producing and
selling illegal drugs is significant. See generally ALEX ALVAREZ & RONET BACHMAN, MUR-
DER AMERICAN STYLE 156-58 (2003).
81 For a description and critique of the punitive turn in the treatment of juveniles in the
criminal justice system, see generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE
(1998).
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against the potential for eventually reintegrating the offender into the com-
munity.  Minor crime can also be punished lightly because social disorder is
understood to be an incident of socioeconomic strain, not as evidence of
deep dysfunction.  Casual drug use can also be punished less severely be-
cause it is less likely that it will grow to epidemic proportions if not harshly
deterred.
The premise of moral breakdown in African American communities—
while much assumed—has never been formally defended, and persuasive
social science evidence suggests that African American inner city communi-
ties did not become normless during the 1960s and 1970s.  Rather, the norms
of these communities became strained by the emergence of a new, concen-
trated form of jobless poverty that emerged shortly after African Americans
had migrated to the urban areas in unprecedented numbers.  Despite these
strains, African Americans in the communities most affected continued to
believe fiercely in the importance of family and hard work.  For this reason,
the fundamentalist policies of mass incarceration have been a tragically
flawed response to urban crime, a response whose collateral damage to Afri-
can American families and communities was not just unnecessary but actu-
ally counterproductive.
A. The Emergence of Jobless Poverty in African American
Inner City Communities
Poverty became more concentrated in many poor, urban neighborhoods
during the 1980s and 1990s.  Our nation’s central cities went from contain-
ing one third of the nation’s poor in 1959 to containing one half in 1991.82
William Julius Wilson has measured urban poverty in terms of ghetto pov-
erty census tracts, census tracts in which 40% or more of the population live
at or below the poverty line.83  The number of census tracts with 40% pov-
erty in our nation’s one hundred largest central cities doubled between 1970
and 1996; currently one out of every seven census tracts in these hundred
cities is “ghetto poor.”84
As ghettos became poorer, they changed in other ways as well.  Urban
ghettos became blacker during the 80s and 90s.  “The number of African
Americans in these ghettos grew by more than a third from 1980 to 1990,”
and “[t]he proportion of metropolitan blacks who live in ghetto areas
climbed from more than a third (37 percent) to almost half (45 percent).”
African American urban ghettos also spread in size during the 1980s and
1990s even as the number of people living in cities generally and in the
ghetto tracts themselves either declined or grew modestly.85  For example,
82 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS:  THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN
POOR 11 (1996).
83 Id. at 12-13.
84 Id. at 14.
85 Id.
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ghetto census tracts in one Chicago study lost almost half their residents
between 1970 and 1990.86
This simultaneous thinning and spreading of the ghetto directly affects
crime, the perception of crime, and community life more generally:
The geographic size of a city’s ghetto has a large effect on the
perception of the magnitude of the problem associated with ghetto
poverty.  How big an area of the city do you consider off limits?
How far out of your way will you drive not to go through a dan-
gerous area?  Indeed, the lower density exacerbated the problem.
More abandoned buildings mean more places for crack dens and
criminal enterprises.  Police trying to protect a given number of
citizens have to be stretched over a wider number of square miles,
making it less likely that criminals will be caught.  Lower density
also makes it harder for a sense of community to develop, or for
people to feel that they can find safety in numbers.87
Ghetto spread, then, perniciously concentrates disadvantage.  As fewer poor
people are spread over a larger area, fighting crime becomes more difficult
and the perception of crime grows with the increase in the size of the ghetto
itself.
The most important change in urban ghetto poverty during the last few
decades, however, was the loss of good jobs for those who lived there.  Wil-
liam Julius Wilson argues that joblessness distinguishes the contemporary
urban poverty of inner-city African communities from its previous forms
and accounts for the increase in many of the inner cities’ social ills, including
crime.  Inner-city African American communities went from places where
most people worked, albeit at very low wages, to places where work was
infrequent, unreliable, and sometimes non-existent.  Writing in 1996, Wilson
wrote:  “For the first time in the twentieth century most adults in many inner
city ghetto neighborhoods are not working in a typical week. . . . Despite
increases in the concentration of poverty since 1970, inner cities have al-
ways featured high levels of poverty, but the current levels of joblessness in
some neighborhoods are unprecedented.”88
The image of the jobless, crime-ridden urban ghetto has become so fa-
miliar that it bears emphasis that widespread, chronic unemployment in
American ghettos was something very new indeed:  “The inner-city ghetto
was not always plagued by low levels of employment and related problems.
In the 1950s, employment rates were high.  People were poor, but they were
still working.  Ghetto neighborhoods were as highly segregated as they are
86 Id. at 16.
87 Id. at 14-15 (quoting Paul A. Jargowsky, Ghetto Poverty Among Blacks in the 1980s, 13
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 288, 297 (1994)).
88 Id. at xiii.  In fifteen black community areas in Chicago that Wilson studied in depth,
“only 37 percent of all adults were gainfully employed in a typical week in 1990.” Id. at 19.
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now, but people were working.”89  African Americans had flocked in large
numbers to these urban communities during the postwar expansion to fulfill
the promise of steadier work, higher wages, and a better life.  That promise
had been fulfilled for many even though these internal migrants faced the
same barriers that the nation’s immigrants from other countries had to face.
African Americans were also “knocked off the job ladder” by each wave of
arriving immigrants, all of whom shared the important advantage of simply
not being African American.90
Wilson makes the important point that poor neighborhoods where peo-
ple are working have much less serious problems than poor, jobless
neighborhoods.91
The consequences of high neighborhood joblessness are more dev-
astating than those of high neighborhood poverty.  A neighbor-
hood in which people are poor but employed is different from a
neighborhood in which people are poor and jobless.  Many of to-
day’s problems in the inner-city ghetto neighborhoods—crime,
family dissolution, welfare, low levels of social organization, and
so on—are fundamentally a consequence of the disappearance of
work.92
Jobs disappeared from many African American communities during the
1980s and 1990s, and the resulting jobless poverty created social conditions
very different from the working poverty that preceded it.
The disappearance of jobs from America’s urban ghettos was part of a
more general economic trend.  Jobs disappeared from the ghetto largely be-
cause jobs for low-skilled workers of all races began to decline in the 1970s.
Real wages for low-skilled workers dropped 30% between 1970 and 1989.93
Jobs also became less dependable, with many more low-skilled workers
holding down part-time or temporary jobs and experiencing longer periods
of unemployment.94  The number of prime-age men without high school di-
plomas who worked year round in eight out of ten years went from two
thirds in the 1970s to half in the 1980s.95
While clearly part of a national trend, the loss of jobs hit African Amer-
icans particularly hard, especially in the deindustrialized cities of the North-
east and Midwest:
89 Id. at 53-54.
90 COONTZ, supra note 71, at 237. R
91 WILSON, supra note 82, at 23 (“Although high-jobless neighborhoods also feature con- R
centrated poverty, high rates of neighborhood poverty are less likely to trigger problems of
social organization if the residents are working.”).
92 Id. at xiii.
93 Id. at 25.
94 Id. at 26-27.
95 Id. at 26 (defining “prime age” as between the ages of twenty-two and fifty-eight).
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Between 1979 and 1984, half the black workers in durable-goods
manufacturing in the Great Lakes region lost their jobs.  The pro-
portion of black men who found employment fell from 80 percent
in 1930 to 56 percent in 1983. . . . Since 1973, even the gains that
employed black men made during the 1960s have largely been re-
versed.  The average real income of young black men fell by al-
most 50 percent between 1973 and 1986. . . . [B]y 1986, the
average black high school dropout earned 61 percent less than he
had in 1973.96
The job losses of the 1970s and 1980s hit African American communities all
the harder because their economic progress during the postwar years had
been far more mixed than those of other groups.97
It bears emphasis that these jobs never came back. The economic ex-
pansion of the 1990s left the unskilled worker largely behind.  “While the
American economy saw a rapid expansion in high technology and services,
especially advanced services, growth in blue-collar factory, transportation,
and construction jobs, traditionally held by men, has not kept pace with the
rise in the working-age population.”98  This shift in employment patterns hit
the poor, the uneducated, and minorities hardest of all.  “The decline of the
mass production system, the decreasing availability of lower-skilled blue-
collar jobs, and the growing importance of training and education in the
higher-growth industries adversely affected the employment rates and earn-
ings of low-skilled black workers, many of whom are concentrated in inner
city ghettos.”99
Wilson points out the multiple ways in which this concentrated and
chronic joblessness can perpetuate itself.
[W]here jobs are scarce, where people rarely, if ever, have the
opportunity to help their friends and neighbors find jobs, and
where there is a disruptive or degraded school life purporting to
prepare youngsters for eventual participation in the work force,
many people eventually lose their feeling of connectedness to
work in the formal economy; they no longer expect work to be a
regular, and regulating, force in their lives.  In the case of young
96 COONTZ, supra note 71, at 245. R
97 Id. at 243.  Coontz explains:
[A]s early as the mid-1950s, the displacement of blacks from southern agriculture
began to outstrip the job openings in other areas of the economy, leading to steadily
rising unemployment even in periods when employed blacks made relative wage
gains.  Even during the height of black social and legal progress, unemployment and
economic polarization increased, and poverty remained severe.
Id.
98 WILSON, supra note 82, at 26. R
99 Id. at 54.  “Among prime-age nonwhite males, the share of those who had no jobs at all
in a given year increased from 3 percent to 17 percent during the last quarter century.” Id. at
26.
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people, they may grow up in an environment that lacks the idea of
work as a central experience of adult life—they have little or no
labor-force attachment.100
In sum, the 1970s saw the emergence of bigger, blacker, poorer, and
more jobless ghettos.  One needs to indulge in no presumptions of moral
breakdown to explain an increase in crime as a result.  Whether norms were
strained or completely broken down would at best remain a completely open
question in the absence of any direct evidence, a woefully inadequate basis
for the employment of a practice as radical and disintegrative as mass
incarceration.
B. The Enduring Norms of Poor African American Communities
When one takes full account of the staggering economic losses suffered
by the African American inner city during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, one
might well understand the widespread belief in a complete moral break-
down.  How could African Americans living in such communities continue
to believe that education and hard work would allow them to get ahead?
How could the African American family withstand the strain of chronic job-
less poverty without breaking down?  Those who have studied these ques-
tions have found that poor African Americans believe more in the
“American Dream” than middle-class blacks, and that changes in the Afri-
can American family reflect not a loss of faith in family values but a fierce
determination to find meaning in family life under the most difficult of
circumstances.
In a comprehensive survey of African American attitudes and opinions,
Jennifer Hochschild sought to assess the depth and extent of African Ameri-
can belief in “the American Dream,” the belief that anyone in America
could prosper through determined effort.  Overall, she found that “blacks
and whites believe equally in the dream as a prescription for society and
almost equally as a description of their own lives.”101  She also found a para-
dox, however.
“As the objective circumstances of the best-off third of blacks
have improved dramatically over the past thirty years, their belief
in the American dream has declined sharply. . . . As the objective
circumstances of the worst-off third of blacks have remained dis-
mal or worsened, their belief in the American dream has not de-
clined very much.”102
Just as people who become richer do not become happier, people who be-
come poorer “do not in any simple way become more embittered or despair-
100 Id. at 52-53.
101 JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM 4 (1995).
102 Id. at 5.
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ing.”103  Moreover, “[m]ost poor blacks . . . see two paths to achieving their
dreams: education and work.”104
Poor African American families believe strongly in education according
to Hochschild’s work.  “[C]ontrolling for sex and socioeconomic status, Af-
rican Americans are no more likely to drop out of school than whites, are
more likely to choose an academic than a vocational curriculum, and are
more likely to choose a four-year than a two-year college.”105  In one study,
Hochschild discovered that poor youth considered hard work and education
to be more important than money and connections in getting ahead:
Over 90 percent of youth in public job training programs see edu-
cation as very important in “getting ahead.”  This response re-
ceives 30 percentage points more support than the next most
important criterion, “hard work,” which comes in ahead of
“money in the family” and “knowing the right people.”  Although
almost all of this sample was black, fewer than one third deemed
race very important in determining success.106
Hochschild also found that poor blacks compared very favorably to other
racial groups in terms of willingness to work:
Many more black than white or Latina poor jobless mothers want a
regular job and are willing to work more than five days a week.
The level of wages below which poor blacks will not accept a job
is almost as low as immigrants and much lower than comparably
poor whites.  Jobless young black men are much more willing than
comparable white men to accept unskilled jobs at low wages, de-
spite their higher aspirations to skilled or white-collar jobs. . . .
Almost twice as many poor blacks (24 percent) as poor whites (14
percent) agree that learning “to work hard” is the most important
thing a child can do to “prepare him or her for life.”  Many more
low-status blacks than any other racial/class group describe them-
selves as “hard-working”; conversely three times as many well-
off as poor blacks admit that “not trying hard enough” has kept
them from getting good jobs.107
Similarly, careful research has authoritatively refuted the idea that poor
African Americans have abandoned mainstream family values.  What much
research shows instead is that African Americans in poor communities have
been frustrated in their ability to fully realize their values by circumstance.
103 Id. at 8.
104 Id. at 159.
105 Id. at 160.
106 Id. at 159-60.
107 HOCHSCHILD, supra note 101, at 160-61.  Hochschild does acknowledge that among R
what she terms the “estranged poor,” the American Dream becomes distorted in ways that can
produce serious crime and dysfunctional behavior. See id. at 184-99.
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In a comprehensive review of the research on African American families,
Stephanie Coontz debunked the idea that the African American family has
collapsed.108  The idea of the collapse of the African American family,
Coontz points out, is hardly new.  “In almost every decade, for 200 years,
someone has ‘discovered’ that the black family is falling apart.”109
Coontz argues that the history of African American families from the
end of slavery through the mid twentieth century is one of tremendous com-
mitment to family despite enormous challenges.  Indeed, Coontz points out
that much of black economic history can be understood in terms of a desire
to keep families together”:
After the Civil War, African Americans went to tremendous
lengths to track down kin, reunite families, and resist destabilizing
family conditions, such as gang labor.” . . . In response to these
pressures many blacks turned to sharecropping as a way of keep-
ing their families together.  Others moved to the cities or made
their way north, taking their families along or sending for them as
soon as possible.110
Coontz also notes that African Americans resisted these strains on their
families well for a very long time.  The largest difference between black and
white households at the start of the nineteenth century was that black house-
holds were more likely to include additional relatives or entire subfamilies.
Unemployment, low wages, and poverty made such extended households
necessary, and sometimes split families up as men left to seek work.  Eco-
nomic pressure also made married black women five times more likely to
work for wages than married white women.111  Most African Americans
lived in two-parent households throughout the nineteenth century.112  Mar-
riage rates were higher among African Americans than among whites.113
Indeed, Coontz describes ways in which African Americans have ap-
peared to surpass other groups in their commitment to family.  Under slav-
ery, African Americans “built a generalized kinship system in which all
adults looked after all children.”114  African American families also appear
to have taken care of needy family members more than many other racial
groups.  “Studies of many cities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
reveal that African American families maintained tighter and more support-
ive kin ties than did other urban families, taking care of elders, paupers, and
orphans within family networks rather than institutionalizing them as fre-
108 COONTZ, supra note 71, at 235. R
109 Id.
110 Id. at 239 (citations omitted).
111 Id. at 240-41.
112 Id. at 239; see also id. at 241 (“Until the 1960s, 75 percent of black households with a
child under the age of eighteen included both a husband and a wife.”).
113 Id. at 241 (“From 1900 to 1950, marriage rates were higher for black women than for
white ones, and black men were just as likely to marry as were white men.”).
114 COONTZ, supra note 71, at 238. R
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quently as other groups did.”115  In sum, Coontz concludes that “[m]any of
the family variations practiced by black Americans have produced healthy
individuals with a strong group consciousness, allowing them to cope with
widespread violence, discrimination, and poverty, and in many cases to rise
above these.”116
Coontz acknowledges that these communities suffered increased drug
addiction, child neglect, and violence.  She denies, however, that these con-
ditions were the results of an absence of family values.117  “The description
of the ghetto as an alien nation, with totally different family values from
mainstream America, is a gross exaggeration.”118  Coontz summarizes re-
search showing that even under these difficult conditions, the performance
of African American men in these communities as fathers is far better than
the public image allows and in some ways better than that of other racial
groups.119  Ironically, adhering too closely to mainstream beliefs under non-
mainstream conditions can itself create family dysfunction.  “[T]he black
men most likely to leave their families when faced with unemployment or
income loss are those who subscribe most firmly to the idea of a self-reliant
male breadwinner.”120
Moreover, African American poverty is also not caused by changes in
black family structure.  “Two out of every three poor blacks living in single-
parent families were poor before their families split up.”121  In fact, the me-
115 Id. at 241.  Some of these earlier patterns persist:  “black men, in spite of ‘macho’
images and language, are more likely to share housework than are their white counterparts.”
Id. at 242.
116 Id. at 242.
117 Id. at 247.
118 Id. at 248.
119 Id. Coontz explains:
[A] recent study of three different ethnic neighborhoods in Brooklyn, New York, all
relatively poor, found few differences in premarital sexual activity and responsibility
between blacks and whites.  A much higher proportion of white men married their
partners on discovery of pregnancy, but most black fathers provided some degree of
support for their children. . . . Indeed, in one national study, poor African-American,
officially absent fathers actually had more contact with their children and gave them
more informal support than did white, middle-class absent fathers.
Id.
120 COONTZ, supra note 71, at 250.  Mainstream beliefs also create other types of stress for R
African American men caught in non-mainstream economic conditions:
Middle-class blacks who believe in a color-blind meritocracy experience tremendous
stress when they encounter setbacks; some studies show that blacks who let them-
selves off the hook by admitting the obstacles posed by racism are better able to
maintain work and educational commitment in the face of reverses than those who
believe in the ethic of individual achievement.
Id.
121 Id. at 251.  Further, Coontz argues:
If black family structures had been the same in 1984 as in 1973, the proportion of
black children living in poverty would have fallen from 41 percent to 38 percent
instead of rising to 43 percent—hardly enough of a difference to win a war on pov-
erty. . . . The 69 percent increase in the number of blacks living at a level below half
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dian income for African American men is so far behind the national median
that Coontz calculates that each African American wife would need four
African American husbands to achieve a middle class standard of living.122
While many Americans attribute poverty to bad choices by welfare
mothers having too many children out of wedlock, the statistics tell a differ-
ent story.  “Contrary to conventional wisdom, shifts in family structure have
not been the most important factor explaining trends in American poverty
rates in recent decades, though they were related to increasing child poverty
rates in the 1970s and 1980s.”123  Research also shows no significant rela-
tionship between Aid to Families with Dependant Children (“AFDC”) and
out-of-wedlock births.  “The rate of out-of-wedlock teen childbearing has
nearly doubled since 1975, despite the fact that during the period the real
value of AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid had fallen, after adjusting for
inflation.”124  After “reviewing the results of more than one hundred empiri-
cal studies on the effects of welfare completed since 1975, analyzing the
case files of more than 1,200 families receiving public assistance in four
states, and interviewing officials from federal, state, and local government
agencies,” the General Accounting Office concluded in 1987 that “there was
no conclusive evidence to support the prevailing common beliefs that wel-
fare discourages individuals from working, breaks up two-parent families, or
affects the childbearing rates of unmarried women, even young unmarried
women.”125  In fact, the “average number of children in welfare families was
slightly less than the average number in nonwelfare families.”126  Simply
put, “economic changes—such as economic growth and income inequal-
ity—have had the strongest association with trends in overall rates, regard-
less of how we measure poverty.”127
While the proportion of single mother families among African Ameri-
cans has increased, that increase is not because either African American men
or women have grown disenchanted with marriage but because of the poor
job prospects of African American men.128  Indeed, “employed black men in
the poverty line since 1978 has occurred among both black married-couple and fe-
male-headed families.
Id. at 252-53.
122 Id. (“If our hypothetical Black family is to enter the middle-class mainstream, which
means home ownership, it will need at least $36,595 or four Black men.”).
123 JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA:  A HANDBOOK 2 (2003).
124 WILSON, supra note 82, at 94. R
125 Id. at 163-64.
126 Id. at 166.
127 ICELAND, supra note 123, at 2. R
128 COONTZ, supra note 71, at 251.  Coontz explains: R
The rising proportion of single-mother families among blacks results from both the
declining birth rate of married black women and a drop in marriage and remarriage
rates.  Both these phenomena should be connected more to the deteriorating eco-
nomic and social position of lower-income black men, denied job prospects by
hyper-segregation and deindustrialization, than to any element of black “culture.”
Id.
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the inner city were over two and a half times more likely to marry the
mother of their child than were unemployed men; the higher a woman’s
earnings potential the more likely she was to marry.”129
More recently, sociologists Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas spent five
years interviewing poor, unmarried mothers soon after childbirth in an effort
to shed light on the decline of marriage among the poor.130  While not lim-
ited to African Americans, most of their interview subjects were either Afri-
can American or people of color.131  What they found, somewhat
paradoxically, was that the related decisions to have children but not to
marry were driven by a fierce commitment to traditional family values com-
bined with a realistic appraisal of the challenges of doing both under circum-
stances of economic instability.  Most of the parents they interviewed had
been romantically involved with the baby’s father at the time the baby was
born, and four out of ten were cohabiting.132  The vast majority of these par-
ents also expressed a plan to eventually marry although few were able to do
so successfully.133  Women expressed a reluctance to marry that was born out
of a deep reverence for and commitment to the institution.
We spent five years talking in depth with women who populate
some of America’s poorest inner-city neighborhoods and, to our
surprise, found astonishingly little evidence of the much-touted re-
jection of the institution of marriage among the poor.  In fact,
these mothers told us repeatedly that they revered marriage and
hoped to be married themselves one day.  Marriage was a dream
that most still longed for, a luxury they hoped to indulge in some-
day when the time was right, but generally not something they saw
happening in the near, or even the foreseeable, future.134
Ironically, many poor women deferred marriage because of very conserva-
tive notions about divorce.135  Many of the interviews suggested that “an
129 Id. at 252.
130 See KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP:  WHY POOR WOMEN
PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005).
131 Id. at 233.
132 Id. at 3-4.
133 Id.  No comparable work utilizing interviews with African American men exists.  Eli-
jah Anderson devotes one chapter of a wide-ranging ethnography of inner city life to “the
mating game.” ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET:  DECENCY, VIOLENCE AND THE
MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 142-78 (1999). In that chapter, Anderson describes a gener-
ally irresponsible and immature approach to sexual activity and relationships by young African
American men, although he suggests that these behaviors are shaped in part by the limited
economic prospects these young men enjoy.  “At times, however, a boy earnestly attempts to
be a dream man, with honorable intentions of ‘doing right’ by the young woman, of marrying
her and living happily ever after according to their version of middle-class propriety.  But the
reality of his poor employment prospects makes it hard for him to follow through.” Id. at 153.
134 EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 130, at 6.
135 Id. at 9 (“The poor women we talked to . . . believe it is better to have children outside
of marriage than to marry unwisely only to get divorced later. . . .  ‘I don’t believe in divorce—
that’s why none of the women in my family are married.’”).
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expectant mother uses pregnancy to test the strength of her bond with her
man and take a measure of his moral worth.  Can he ‘get himself together’—
find a job, settle down, and become a family man—in time?”136  Poor wo-
men also deferred marriage in part out of fears of dependence born of their
own economic weakness.137
While the women interviewed readily deferred marriage out of a sense
of reverence, they were unwilling to defer childbearing because of the deep
sense of meaning and responsibility they derived from being a mother.
“While the poor women we interviewed saw marriage as a luxury, some-
thing they aspired to but feared they might never achieve, they judged chil-
dren to be a necessity, an absolutely essential part of a young woman’s life,
the chief source of identity and meaning.”138  Indeed, particularly troubled
young women often described having a baby as an act of ultimate responsi-
bility, an attempt to remake one’s self by taking on a sacred obligation to
another.  “These mothers, we discovered, almost never see children as bring-
ing them hardship; instead, they manage to credit virtually every bit of good
in their lives to the fact they have children—they believe motherhood has
‘saved’ them.”139
C. Criminal Justice Fundamentalism as a Flawed
Response to Moral Strain
Mass incarceration profoundly harms the most vulnerable part of the
African American population by disintegrating legions of African American
men from family and economic life.  In so doing, mass incarceration effec-
tively rolls back many of the gains of the civil rights movement for African
136 Id. at 7.
137 Id. at 9.  As Edin and Kefalas explain:
Poor women often say they don’t want to marry until they are “set” economically
and established in a career.  A young mother often fears marriage will mean a loss of
control—she believes that saying “I do” will suddenly transform her man into an
authoritarian head of the house who insists on making all the decisions, who thinks
that he “owns” her.  Having her own earnings and assets buys her some “say-so”
power and some freedom from a man’s attempts to control her behavior.
Id.
138 Id. at 6.
139 Id. at 11.  While perhaps not a recipe for childrearing under ideal circumstances, the
desire of this group of particularly troubled poor women to improve themselves by taking on
the obligations of raising a child expresses a hyper-developed faith in the power of and need
for personal responsibility to make life meaningful.  Edin and Kefalas write:
[W]e paint a portrait of the lives of these young women before pregnancy, a portrait
that details the extreme loneliness, the struggle with parents and peers, the wild
behavior, the depression and despair, the school failure, the drugs, and the general
sense that life has spun completely out of control.  Into this void comes a pregnancy
and then a baby, bringing the purpose, the validation, the companionship, and the
order that young women feel have been so sorely lacking.  In some profound sense,
these young women believe, a baby has the power to solve everything.
Id. at 10.
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Americans living in the communities most affected.  The emergence of the
jobless ghetto traps residents in thinned out neighborhoods with high pov-
erty rates.  They live in “that part of town” that no one else wants to visit or
acknowledge, and become scapegoats for the larger city’s problems.  This is
an intense form of social exclusion that rivals Jim Crow and other, earlier
forms of racial subordination long since recognized as unjust and unwise.
These neighborhoods do produce serious crime out of statistical propor-
tion to their population, but not out of moral proportion to their dire eco-
nomic circumstances.  Poverty has always produced more crime than
abundance, and it should surprise no one that jobless poverty in particular
produces crime.  Yet if we believe the direct evidence, the residents of these
poor, jobless neighborhoods still cling to mainstream economic and family
values.  They believe as much in the American Dream as those who have a
better opportunity to experience it.  If anything, they hold themselves to un-
realistic standards of achievement given their economic circumstances.
With respect to family, these same people cherish the opportunity to bring
children into the world so much that they often do so under the most tenuous
of circumstances.  They respect the institution of marriage so much that they
will not risk entering one if they cannot see it enduring.
One can certainly disagree with the choices that inner-city African
Americans make in pursuit of these values.  African American women who
deferred having children until they found a life partner might be better able
to be the sort of parent that they would like to be.  Even if true, however, the
fault lies not in the failure of individuals to hold values but the failure to
pursue them more effectively.
The fundamentalist approach to criminal justice dictates a categorical
response to crimes, not a contextual one.  Rather than making judgments
about the individual and the crime at hand, criminal justice fundamentalism
prioritizes the need to unambiguously condemn offenders without preparing
them for eventual reintegration into the community.  I have argued here that
the criminal justice fundamentalists’ unarticulated premise is that crime in
these communities occurs because individuals and the community lack
mainstream values.  Disintegrating the individual from the community
through incarceration on a massive scale seems justified under such a pre-
mise because an offender without values has no potential of living an inte-
grated life in his community.  The fundamentalists believe that a normless
community provides little into which such an offender could successfully
reintegrate.
This presumption in favor of disintegration is a practical and moral mis-
take.  It is a practical mistake because it frustrates its own primary goal—the
prevention and control of crime.  In destroying the normal life course of so
many African American men, mass incarceration regenerates the crime it
seeks to control.  It is a moral mistake because it misconceives the possibili-
ties of the individuals and communities involved by assuming them not to
aspire to the same values as mainstream America.
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\44-2\HLC208.txt unknown Seq: 31 27-MAY-09 8:46
2009] Mass Incarceration 507
The crime rate of inner city African American communities reflects se-
rious strain on the norms of moral behavior, to be sure.  Furthermore, the
strain produced by concentrated jobless poverty shows no sign of lifting any
time soon.  In the meantime, it goes without saying that laws need to be
enforced and offenders punished.  What does not go without saying is that
only the most severe and most inflexible sentences are appropriate responses
to the crime produced by jobless poverty.  One need ask for no special
across-the-board discount for ghetto-poor offenders on account of socioeco-
nomic disadvantage.  One need only ask for a return to sentences that bear a
more rational relation to the blameworthiness of the offender and to the
harm of the offense and for a sentencing process that permits more room for
contextual adjustments.
V. CONCLUSION
The continued quest for equal civil rights for African Americans is a
battle with many fronts.  Sound arguments can be made that continued pro-
gress on anti-discrimination and affirmative action in other arenas will gain
more for the African American community in the foreseeable future than an
attempt to take up the cause of the least popular and perhaps most despised
element of their population—the incarcerated.  The incarcerated are, after
all, in prison by virtue of the fact that courts have found them to have com-
mitted crimes deemed serious by society.  Making mass incarceration a cen-
tral front in the battle for civil rights may be essential to making progress on
any other front, however, because of the rhetorical effects of mass incarcera-
tion on the broader quest for civil rights for African Americans.
The mass incarceration of African Americans has come to seem normal
in the same way that segregation once seemed normal.  When a practice
such as segregation or mass incarceration shapes much of what people think
about some aspect of their society, that practice becomes what I would call a
“social fact.”  A social fact is an influential and pervasive practice that rein-
forces the justifications for its own existence in a self perpetuating way.
Segregation separated the races, and in that separation invidious racial atti-
tudes and beliefs about African Americans flourished and in turn provided
continued justification for the separation.  Likewise, mass incarceration
brands African American men from the inner cities as a largely criminal
group, and it brands the neighborhoods in which they live as normless com-
munities that have suffered complete moral breakdown.  Those brands, in
turn, justify the harsh penal practices that perpetuate the mass incarceration
of African American men.
The influence of mass incarceration as a social fact, however, extends
beyond simply perpetuating its own existence.  In validating the myth of
moral breakdown, mass incarceration directly undermines the broader move-
ment for civil rights for all African Americans.  Just as criminal justice fun-
damentalism views lenity in punishment as risking corruption of the
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normless members of inner city communities, so too does a fundamentalist
notion of racial justice view affirmative action and aggressive anti-discrimi-
nation measures as potentially corrupting those who have not yet internal-
ized the values necessary to educational and economic success.  Indeed,
racial fundamentalism in its purest form argues that African Americans have
been corrupted by the availability of the “excuse” of racial discrimination as
an explanation for their lack of educational and economic success.  Ulti-
mately, both the criminal justice fundamentalism of mass incarceration and
the racial fundamentalism of “color-blind” opposition to affirmative action
and anti-discrimination measures are grounded in a vision of moral break-
down among African Americans.  Just as the early successes of the civil
rights movement rested heavily on appeals to moral authority, the backlash
against that movement has relied heavily on a reverse sort of moral appeal—
it has sought to strip the quest for racial justice of its moral authority by
describing poor African Americans as essentially immoral.140  In this sense,
mass incarceration has “demoralized” the quest for continued racial justice.
Challenging the mass incarceration of African Americans is ultimately
the most powerful and direct way of challenging the myth of moral break-
down among African Americans that is central to both mass incarceration
and to opposition to further remedies for racial discrimination.  In a very
important sense, the criminal justice system has become the unguarded flank
of the battle for racial justice, one that has been effectively exploited by
those who would deny or minimize the existence of continuing racial dis-
crimination and who would oppose affirmative measures to reduce its ef-
fects.  Retaking that front is essential to “re-moralizing” the continuing fight
for civil rights.
The national reaction to the Jena Six suggests that perhaps the time
might indeed be ripe for such a challenge and that the ideology of mass
incarceration may be waning.  At the heart of the mass incarceration of Afri-
can Americans is the selective enforcement and disproportionate punishment
of racially neutral categories of crime.  Those incarcerated are, for the most
part, guilty of crime.  What is most striking about the Jena Six case is that
arguably many of the defendants broke one law or another.  Nonetheless,
10,000 people from all over the country descended on Jena to protest the
selective and disproportionate way in which these crimes were prosecuted.
To be sure, the central role which nooses played in the narrative of the
case explains much of the response.  The noose is a naked symbol of racial
oppression given the shameful history of lynching of African Americans in
our near past, and its deployment in the deep South triggered particularly
powerful and painful memories.141  Still, it is interesting and perhaps promis-
ing that the people who marched on Jena did not require a more straightfor-
140 See supra Part III.A.
141 See Jeannine Bell, The Hangman’s Noose and the Lynch Mob:  Hate Speech and the
Jena Six, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (2009).
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ward moral narrative about innocent youth wrongly accused to trigger their
sense of outrage.  It was enough that the Jena Six were punished out of
proportion to what they did, in a fundamentalist way that took no account of
a context that matters very much.  If the plight of these six—not entirely
blameless but not sufficiently blameworthy—African American youth can
trigger such response, maybe the time has come when we can successfully
challenge the broader policies of mass incarceration that flow from the same
fundamentalist mindset.
